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M.: Domestic Relations--Parental Immunity Not Extended to Stepfather

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
v. United States, 110 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Jones v. United
States, 284 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1956).
F. L. D., Jr.

DOMESTIC RELATIONs-PARENTAL ImuNrTY NOT EXTENMED TO

ST

ATBER.-P, an unemancipated minor, was seriously injured

while riding in his stepfather's truck. The accident was the result
of alleged negligent operation by the stepfather's agent. P was not
employed by the stepfather but occasionally "helped ouf' in the
business. P lived with his mother and stepfather, and the stepfather
voluntarily stood in loco parentis to P. P sued the stepfather to
recover damages for his personal injuries. Held, although the stepfather voluntarily stood in loco parentis, he was not under any
legal obligation to care for, guide or control the child. Since the
death of P's father this obligation had fallen to P's mother. Only
the mother had the power to emancipate, and P's reciprocal legal
obligations were only to his mother. There is no justification for
extending the doctrine of parental immunity from suit to one
voluntarily standing in loco parentis, such as stepfather. Burdick v.
Naw-rocki, 154 A.2d 242 (Conn. 1959).
Itmay be said as a general proposition of law, that a parent is
immune from suit by an unemancipated minor for negligence
resulting in personal injury to the child. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass.
480, 13 N.E.2d 488 (1938); Crosby v. Crosby, 280 App. Div. 651,
246 N.Y.S. 384 (1930); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 425 (1951). The underlying reason of the parental immunity doctrine is quite simple. Society's concern for the stability of the family unit far exceeds the
right of the individual to redress for the occasional tort by a parent
to a child. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
The principal case refused to extend the doctrine of parental
immunity to a stepfather voluntarily standing in loco parentis. The
wisdom of the general rule was not questioned, but the denial of
application of the rule was based entirely upon the legal relationship of the parties. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an
unemancipated minor may sue a stepparent standing in loco
parentis, but there is a definite trend to extend the immunity to a
stepparent where only ordinary negligence is envolved. Reingold v.
Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); 39 AM. Jua. Parent &
Child § 90 (1942). The stepfather is not in loco parentis to the child
merely by virtue of the fact he is a stepfather. Such a person must
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put himself in the position of a natural father by assuring the obligations incident to being a father without having legally adopted the
child. Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946).
One who stands in loco parentis has the same rights and duties
as a natural parent as long as he continues in that relationship and
is bound to the same standard of care and diligence. Cashen v.
Riney, 239 Ky. 779, 40 S.W.2d 339 (1931). If the stepfather standing in loco parentis has acquired the same rights and duties as a
natural father it would seem that he should be immune from the
stepchild's action for damages. Many courts have held that he is not
amenable to suits based on ordinary negligence. Leyerly v. United
States, 162 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947); Gillett v. Cillett, 168 Cal.2d
102, 835 P.2d 736 (1959); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300
Pac. 7 (1931); In Re Adoption of Cheney, 244 Ia. 1180, 59 N.W.2d
685 (1953).
Those cases which have denied parental immunity
parents have generally involved a wilful element such as
cruelty. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961
Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).

to stepextreme
(1939);
(1901);

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that a
natural parent may not be sued by an unemancipated minor for
injuries resulting from ordinary negligence. Securro v. Securro,
110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931). However, the above decision
was somewhat qualified by the later case of Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932), wherein the court held that a child
could sue his father for injuries caused by the ordinary negligence
of the father only when the father was covered by liability insurance. The court said that where the reason for the rule is gone
the rule will not be applied.
In the principal case, the Connecticut court in expressing its
opinion that an unemancipated minor may not maintain an action
based on negligence against the parents has agreed with the general rule on this matter and supported the rule by a quotation which
sets out the reason for the rule as follows: "'The peace of society,
and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests
of society, forbid to a minor child a right to appear in court in the
assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered
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at the hands of the parent'". Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn.
77, 84, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929), as quoted in the principal case at
243.
TFhe policy, as above stated, is clearly for the benefit of society,
yet it is denied application in this instance, not on the basis of merit,
but rather upon a technical distinction of legal relationships. It is
difficult to visualize a valid reason for such a distinction. If the
rational foundation of the rule is at all sound, it must be equally
sound when applied to circumstances involving a stepparent standing in loco parentis. The undesirable conditions sought to be prevented by the application of this rule are present indeed in the
situation presented by the principal case.
W. E. M.
EMINENT Do

_n-CoNsTrrTruONAL TAxING-REcovERY AGAINST

MNxucn'AL AIRPORT BY ADJACENT PROPERTY OwNERs.-Action by
owners of vacant and unoccupied land adjoining a municipally
owned airport to recover the diminution in value of their land
caused by the fact that airplanes passed over the land at low
altitudes while taking off and landing. Claims were stated in trespass and nuisance but the essence of the action was based primarily
on the theory that the flights constituted an unconstitutional taking
of property. Held, that the alleged continuing and frequent low
flights over the land amount to a taking of an air easement for the
purpose of flying airplanes over the land. The municipality had the
power to acquire an approach way by condemnation but failed to
exercise that power with the result that the continuing flights constituted an unconstitutional taking by the municipality. Ackerman
v. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1960).
The fundamental problem presented in this case was one of
first impression in Washington, extending and settling areas of dispute raised in a previous case. Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 49 Wash.
2d 52,8, 304 P.2d 705 (1956). For a report of the principal case on
the first hearing, see Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 829 P.2d 210
(Wash. 1958).
Two conflicting fundamental principles are involved in the
instant case, one being the ownership of private property and the
right to the free use and enjoyment thereof, the other being the
authority of the government to regulate the use and utlization of
private property for the promotion of the public welfare. The
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